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lthough many European governments have announced expenditure cuts and tax hikes, 
their debt-to-GDP ratios continue to deteriorate. So, if the purpose of austerity was to 
reduce debt levels, its critics are right: fiscal belt-tightening has failed. But the goal of 
austerity was not just to stabilise debt ratios. 
In fact, austerity has worked as advertised in some cases. Germany temporarily increased the 
fiscal deficit by about 2.5 percentage points of GDP during the global recession of 2009; 
subsequent  rapid  deficit  reduction  had  no  significant  negative  impact on  growth.  So  it  is 
possible  to  reduce  deficits  and  keep  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  in  check  –  provided  that  the 
economy does not start out with large imbalances and that the financial system is working 
properly. Obviously, the countries on the eurozone’s periphery do not meet these conditions. 
Countries whose governments have either lost access to normal market financing (like Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal), or face very high risk premia (like Italy and Spain in 2011-12) simply 
do  not  have  a  choice:  they  must  reduce their  expenditure  or obtain  financing  from  some 
official  body  like  the  International  Monetary  Fund  or  the  European  Stability  Mechanism 
(ESM).  But  foreign  official  financing  will  always  be  subject  to lenders’  conditions  – and 
lenders  see  no  reason  to  finance  ongoing  spending  at  the  level  that  led  the  country  into 
trouble. 
So,  in  the  eurozone  periphery,  austerity  is  not  a  question  of  fine-tuning  demand,  but  of 
ensuring governments’ solvency. Economists like to point out that solvency has little to do 
with the ratio of public debt to today’s GDP, and much to do with debt relative to expected 
future tax revenues. A government’s solvency thus depends much more on long-term growth 
prospects than on the current debt-to-GDP ratio. 
A reduction in the deficit today might lead in the short run to a fall in GDP that is larger than 
the cut in the deficit (if the so-called ‘multiplier’ is larger than one), which can cause the debt-
to-GDP ratio to rise. But almost all economic models imply that a cut in expenditure today 
should  lead  to  higher  GDP  in  the  long  run,  because  it  allows  for  lower  taxes  (and  thus 
economic distortions). 
Austerity should thus always be beneficial for solvency in the long run, even if the debt-to-
GDP ratio deteriorates in the short run. For this reason, the current increase in debt-to-GDP 
ratios in southern Europe should not be interpreted as evidence that austerity does not work. 
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Moreover,  austerity  has  been  accompanied  by  structural  reforms,  which  should  increase 
countries’ long-term growth potential, while pension reforms are set to reduce considerably 
the fiscal cost of aging populations. Such reforms promise to strengthen the solvency of all 
governments that adopt them, including those on the periphery of the eurozone. 
More  importantly,  austerity  has  been  very  successful  in  restoring  external  balance  to the 
eurozone’s periphery. The current accounts of all southern eurozone countries are improving 
rapidly and, with the exception of Greece, will soon swing into surplus. This fundamental 
change has contributed to the reduction in risk premia over the last year, despite the political 
upheaval that continues in many countries (particularly Italy, Portugal and Greece). 
This external aspect is crucial. If public debt is owed to domestic investors, it can be serviced 
with the taxes levied on GDP. But debt owed to foreigners can be serviced only with goods 
and services sold abroad – that is, exports. Thus, the key variable for countries that had large 
current-account deficits, and thus are burdened today with a large foreign debt, is not the debt-
to-GDP ratio, but the foreign debt-to-exports ratio (together with the growth prospects for 
exports). 
Here, developments are encouraging. During the boom years, when countries like Greece, 
Portugal  and  Spain  were  running  ever-larger  external  deficits,  their  exports  did  not  grow 
quickly, so their foreign debt-to-exports ratio deteriorated steadily, reaching levels that are 
usually regarded as a warning signal. For example, for Spain and Portugal, the sum of past 
deficits relative to annual exports reached 300% and 400%, respectively, in 2008, whereas a 
250% ratio is often regarded as the threshold at which external-financing problems can arise. 
With austerity, imports have crashed everywhere in the periphery, while exports – helped also 
by falling labour costs – are increasing (except in Greece). As a result, as shown in the figure 
below,  these  countries’  current  accounts  are  now  moving  into  surplus  and  their  external 
solvency is improving rapidly.  
Cumulated current account balances as % of exports of goods and services (excluding oil) 
 
Note: Oil excluded from exports because for these countries oil exports consist only of re-exports of crude as 
refined products and the value-added margin of the refinery is a small fraction of the value of these exports. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat and the IMF (WEO database). THE AUSTERITY DEBATE IS BESIDE THE POINT | 3 
 
Indeed, according to the IMF, Spain should record growing current-account surpluses over the 
next five years, as exports rise strongly, thus cutting the external debt-to-export ratio by half 
(to about 150% in 2018), while Portugal’s  should  fall to about 250%. Even Italy, whose 
external deficits have remained small, will soon record a current-account surplus. 
Austerity always involves huge social costs, but it is unavoidable when a country has lived 
beyond its means and lost the confidence of its foreign creditors. The external fundamentals of 
the eurozone periphery are now improving rapidly. In this sense, austerity has done exactly 
what it was intended to do. 
 